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Lower Court Decision Mooted by
Settlement: Repeat Litigants Slide
into Home with Second Circuit
Decision
Major League Baseball Properties, Inc. v. Pacific Trading Cards, Inc.'
I. INTRODUCTION
"We find it quite impossible to assess the effect of our holding, either way, upon
the frequency or systematic value of settlement. ,2
At heart in the scholarship advocating Alternative Dispute Resolution are two
interests: one, that using processes such as negotiation, mediation, and arbitration
conserve public and private resources otherwise expended on litigation; and two, that
in certain circumstances, these alternative processes may provide better justice than
would occur in litigation.' However, once litigation of a case has commenced, and
an adverse judgment has been made against one party, that party may not be willing
to settle the case unless the adverse judgement is vacated.4 Historically, most state
and federal courts would routinely grant vacatur when requested by litigants who
settled their disputes.' Since the Supreme Court held in United States Bancorp
Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership that federal courts should not vacate
decisions mooted by settlement absent exceptional circumstances, federal courts
have been reluctant to grant such requests.6 This presumption against vacatur
1. 150 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 1998).
2. United States Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 513 U.S. 18, 28 (1994).
3. See, e.g., Brandon T. Allen, A New Rationale for an Old Practice: Vacatur and the Rules of
Professional Responsibility, 76 TEX. L. REv. 661, 665-67 (1998) (discussing the tension between the
private and public models of litigation); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, For and Against Settlement: Uses and
Abuses ofthe Mandatory Settlement Conference, 33 UCLA L. REv. 485, 500-01 (1985) (discussing need
to distinguish between public and private disputes in determining if settlement is appropriate, and stating
that "parties will frequently opt out of adjudication precisely because the limited remedial imagination
of courts makes justice less possible in adjudication than in individually tailored settlements").
4. See generally Vacatur Following Settlement Pending Appeal, 10 No. 9 FED. LITIGATOR 292, 292
(1995) [hereinafter Pending Appeal] (discussing facts of Moatta v. District Director of Immigration &
Naturalization Services, 61 F.3d 117 (1st Cir. 1995), in which settlement "was totally dependant on
vacatur").
5. See Vacatur-Settlement Agreement, 11 No. 10 FED. LITIGATOR 302, 302 (1996) [hereinafter
Vacatur-Settlement] (discussing Second Circuit rule favoring vacatur following settlement prior to
United States Bancorp).
6. 513 U.S. 18 (1994); see discussion supra Part llI.B (only three court of appeals have permitted
vacatur due to settlement).
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arguably discourages settlement. 7 It is against this backdrop that the Second Circuit
considered the facts of Major League Baseball Properties, Inc. v. Pacific Trading
Cards, Inc.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
In April 1998, Major League Baseball Properties, Inc. ("MLB") brought a
trademark infringement and unfair competition suit in the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York against Pacific Trading Cards, Inc. ("Pacific")
alleging that Pacific was manufacturing and distributing baseball trading cards
depicting major-league baseball players wearing MLB-trademarked uniforms.'
MLB had granted Pacific licenses to issue trading cards in past years with the
understanding that Pacific could not use MLB's trademarks without MLB's consent;
however, MLB refused to grant Pacific a license for its current set of cards.9 MLB
argued that Pacific's use of the players' photographs in its current set of cards
breached the prior agreements between MLB and Pacific.'0 To prevent the
distribution of the unauthorized cards, MLB requested a preliminary injunction from
the district court."
Doubting the merits of MLB's claims, the district court denied MLB's motion.'
2
MLB subsequently filed a motion with the U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit,
for an injunction pending appeal of the district courfs order. 3 The Court of Appeals
indicated that it would not be able to hear the merits of the claim for two months and
that it intended to grant MLB's motion unless Pacific posted sufficient bond to secure
MLB's claims.' 4 The court then suggested that the parties attempt to negotiate a
settlement and assigned staff counsel to mediate their discussions."
When the parties reconvened with the appellate court judges in chambers,
Pacific informed the court that it would have difficulty posting the bond necessary
to prevent the court from granting the injunction but emphasized that an injunction
would have a financially ruinous effect, even if Pacific later prevailed on the claims
of the appeal.' 6 Pacific, therefore, wanted to settle the case, but because MLB was
concerned about the effect of the district court's decision on future litigation, the
7. Allen, supra note 3, at 661, 680 (stating that the United States Bancorp decision "cuts against the
grain of settlement"); cf. Daniel Purcell, The Public Right to Precedent: A Theory and Rejection of
Vacatur, 85 CALF. L. REv. 867, 884 (1997) (stating that "the availability of vacatur discourages as many
pretrial settlements as it encourages postjudgment settlements").
8. Pacific Trading, 150 F.3d at 150. Actually, Pacific had manufactured the cards but had not yet
distributed them when the suit was brought. Id.





14. Id. at 150-51.
15. Id. at 151.
16. Id.
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parties informed the court that they would not be able to reach a settlement unless
the district court's order was vacated.'7
Concluding that Pacific's desire to settle the case coupled with MLB's legal
obligation to proceed with the litigation absent a vacatur presented "exceptional
circumstances" sufficient to satisfy the rule of United States Bancorp, the Court of
Appeals vacated the district court's opinion as moot and dismissed MLB's motion for
an injunction. 8
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Balancing the Social Value of Settlements against
the Social Value of Judicial Precedents
The layperson typically views the law as an adversary process, with the
individual attorney fighting to represent the interests of his or her client to the
exclusion of his opponent. When parties are unable to resolve their differences on
their own, courts often provide a preferred mechanism for handling disputes.' 9 For
example, resolving disputes through litigation (1) allows a neutral third party or
parties to determine if there was injury and the extent of that injury; (2) provides a
measure of damages to remedy that injury; and (3) provides a means to enforce that
remedy if the losing party fails to comply with the court order. When the court
perceives that the parties may be able to reach a resolution on their own, however,
it generally encourages them to do so.20
By encouraging parties to settle, courts save both the litigants and the courts the
time and expense of further litigation.2 Many times the parties will be able to reach
a satisfactory remedy through settlement that a court would not be able to provide. 2
17. Id. If the lower court's opinion was not vacated, MLB would be subject to the defense of
acquiescence in future trademark cases. Id.
18. Id. at 152; see discussion infra Part Il1.
19. See Purcell, supra note 7, at 881 (1997) (citing examples where parties would disfavor settlement);
William Burger, Isn 't There a Better Way? Annual Report on the State of the Judiciary, reprinted in
LEONARD L. RiSKIN & JAMES E. WESTBROOK, DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS 8-11 (abridged ed.
1988) (stating that "often the courts are the only avenue to justice").
20. See Allen, supra note 3, at 661 ("The law favors settlement and compromise."); see also Federal
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 554(c)(1), 556(c)(6)-(8) (1994) (requiring that agencies give
parties opportunity to settle; encouraging consideration of various forms of ADR); FED. R. EVID. 408
advisory committee's note (evidence that parties offered or accepted compromise is inadmissible to show
liability or invalidity of a claim, in part because of "the public policy favoring the compromise and
settlement of disputes").
21. See Purcell, supra note 7, at 882-83 (stating that pretrial settlements save "time, paper and labor
hours" but dismissing argument of courts that post-trial settlements do the same).
As the parties in Pacific Trading were encouraged to settle, not forced to, the issues involved in court-
ordered settlement will not be discussed in this Note. For a discussion of the advantages and
disadvantages of court-ordered mediation, see Julie Heintz, Mediating Instead of "Mediating, " 75 U.
DET. MERCY L. REv. 333 (1998).
22. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 3.
1999]
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In addition, some parties may prefer settlement to avoid publicity, to avoid adverse
judgments, or simply to ensure a payoff.23
As the facts in Pacific Trading illustrate, settlement may be impossible to
achieve unless a prior judgment in the proceedings can be vacated.' Because the
public record will show the judgment disfavoring one party but not the later
compromise, parties who could be prejudiced in future proceedings by past adverse
judgements or who do not want the publicity of an adverse judgment will disfavor
settlement unless there is a possibility of vacatur.25
Prior to United States Bancorp, when parties settled their dispute while an
appeal was pending, the courts would almost routinely grant the parties' request for
vacatur.26 Because the United States Bancorp decision applies only to federal courts,
this is still the policy in many state courts.27 For example, following the United
States Bancorp decision, Texas has continued to permit vacatur of opinions.28 In
addition, California courts have adopted a rule for stipulated reversal, reversing the
decision of a lower court on stipulation of the parties.29 This practice has been
lauded for encouraging settlement between the parties while lessening the burden on
the courts.30
Given the social value of settlements, the Supreme Court's decision in United
States Bancorp establishing a rule disfavoring vacatur following settlement may
seem anomalous. Central to the court's analysis was its recognition of vacatur as an
extraordinary remedy, requiring the appealing party to carry the burden of
demonstrating entitlement to the remedy.3 Where the party seeking vacatur caused
the moomess by voluntary action, such as settlement, rather than by happenstance,
the court is less likely to find that equity demands vacatur because that party
"voluntarily forfeited his legal remedy. 3 2 Thus, the court found that vacatur
following mootness by settlement should only be granted under "exceptional
circumstances."33
Although the Court acknowledged that there is a social value to settlement, it
concluded that the social value of judicial precedents is greater because precedents
are "valuable to the legal community as a whole."34 For example, disfavoring
vacatur allows the prior judicial decision to be used against the losing party in future
cases through the doctrines of collateral estoppel and resjudicata, thus promoting
23. See Purcell, supra note 7, at 882.
24. See discussion supra Part II; Pending Appeal, supra note 4, at 292.
25. See Purcell, supra note 7, at 867-68.
26. See Vacatur-Settlement, supra note 5, at 302. United States Bancorp changed this policy for
federal courts, permitting vacatur of lower court decisions mooted by settlement only if justified by
exceptional circumstances. 513 U.S. 18 (1994).
27. See Allen, supra note 3, at 663-64, 675.
28. Id. at 675-77 (citing Pantera Corp. v. American Dairy Queen, 908 S.W.2d 300 (1995)).
29. See Steven R. Harmon, Unsettling Settlements: Should Stipulated Reversals be Allowed to Trump
Judgments" Collateral Estoppel Effects under Neary?, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 479, 480 (1997); Purcell, supra
note 7, at 878-79.
30. See Harmon, supra note 29, at 480.
31. United States Bancorp, 513 U.S. at 26.
32. Id. at 25.
33. Id. at 29.
34. Id. at 26 (citing lzumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v. United States Phillips Corp., 510 U.S.
27, 40 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
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consistency in judgments. 3" Furthermore, judicial precedents enhance order in
society by providing rules on which potential litigants may base their behavior.36
Finally, judicial precedents are valuable because they further the concept of the
integrity of the judicial process, in that members of society will believe that courts
will base their decisions on what is just, not on which party has the most money or
influence."
Another rationale for disfavoring vacatur is that a general policy to grant vacatur
actually discourages settlement, at least in the pre-trial stage.38 This argument is
premised on the notion that if the parties to a lawsuit are aware that vacatur is an
option, they initially will proceed through one round of litigation to see if they can
prevail, only considering settlement if they receive an adverse judgement.39 But, as
other legal scholars have noted, determining whether and when to settle a case is, or
should be, the prerogative of the parties.'
B. How Other Circuits Have Addressed the
Exceptional Circumstances Test
The Supreme Court in United States Bancorp did not address what constitutes
"exceptional circumstances" and there have been few lower court decisions
interpreting the "exceptional circumstances" standard.4' To date, only three circuit
courts, including the Second Circuit court in the instant decision, have found that
exceptional circumstances warranted the granting of vacatur of a lower court
decision mooted by settlement.42
The Fourth Circuit was the first court after United States Bancorp to find that
vacatur of a court decision mooted by settlement was appropriate. In the unreported
decision of In re: General Motors Corporation, the court partially vacated the order
of a judge which demanded production of in camera documents but later was stayed
by the appellate court when a court considering a different case involving General
Motors demanded production pursuant to the prior court's order, because of the
35. See Purcell, supra note 7, at 869; Harmon, supra note 29, at 480, 503. But see United States v.
Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 40 (1950) (granting vacatur because it "clears the path for future
litigation").
36. See Purcell, supra, note 7, at 869 (stating that courts develop or articulate social norms).
37. See id.; see also Harmon, supra note 29, at 480.
38. United States Bancorp, 513 U.S. at 28; see Purcell, supra note 7, at 868.
39. See Purcell, supra note 7, at 868.
40. See Allen, supra note 3, at 681-82 ("Giving the parties control over the objectives and scope of
representation, in terms of settlement, makes them masters of their own case." Allen also argues that
it is the professional responsibility of the attorney to seek vacatur after settlement if in the best interest
of the client.).
41. Pacific Trading, 150 F.3d at 151. However, courts have granted vacatur when the prior decision
was mooted for some reason other than settlement. See, e.g., American Games, Inc. v. Trade Prods., Inc.,
142 F.3d 1164, 1166 (9th Cir. 1998) (mooted by merger); Haley v. Pataki, 60 F.3d 137, 142 (2d Cir.
1995) (mooted by voluntary compliance with preliminary injunction).
42. The First Circuit found exceptional circumstances in the case Motta v. District Dir. of Immigration
& Naturalization Servs., 61 F.3d 117(ist Cir. 1995), discussed infra Part IV. The Fourth Circuit found
exceptional circumstances in the case In re General Motors Corp., No. 94-2435, 1995 WL 940063 (4th
Cir. Feb. 17, 1995).
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privileged status of the documents and the impropriety of permitting a prior
discovery order stayed in a previous case to be binding in a later case.43
Taking a different approach, the First Circuit examined the "best interests of the
parties" in deciding Motta v. District Director of Immigration & Naturalization
Services." In Motta, the Department of Immigration and Naturalization Services
("INS") appealed a district court's decision to stay an immigrant's deportation until
the Board of Immigration Appeals could evaluate the immigrant's motion to reopen
the deportation proceedings and the U.S. Court of Appeals could review that
decision, if appealed.45 The court suggested settlement and both parties were
interested, but one party, INS, would not settle unless the court of appeals would
vacate the district court's decision, due to the INS's concern that the lower court's
decision could impact future litigation.46 Because "the appellee, not the appellant,
initiated consideration of settlement" and both parties were interested in vacatur, the
court held that the interest in vacating the district court's opinion outweighed the
social value of its precedent, and thus vacated the decision of the district court.47
The Eighth Circuit is the only other federal circuit that has published and
opinion addressing whether particular facts warranted a finding of exceptional
circumstances necessary to vacate a decision mooted by settlement. But, in contrast
to the cases cited above, it refused to vacate. Nahrebeski v. Cincinnati Milacron
Marketing Co., involved a claim brought under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act.48 The court did not describe the facts of the case in any detail, but
simply stated that it found no exceptional circumstances, noting that mootness by
settlement does not alone "justify vacation of the judgment being reviewed. '49
None of the other circuits have published opinions addressing the issue of
whether a district court decision should be vacated when mooted by settlement.
Therefore, the court in Pacific Trading had little authority on which to base its
decision to vacate. And, because parties who settle cases and are granted vacatur
are unlikely to file appeals, the issue of what constitutes exceptional circumstances
may completely evade Supreme Court review.50
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In evaluating whether the facts of the instant case justified vacatur, Chief Judge
Winter, writing for a unanimous court, first articulated the court's general authority
43. General Motors, 1995 WL 940063, at * 1.
44. 61 F.3d 117 (lst Cir. 1995).
45. Motta, 61 F.3d at 117.
46. Pacific Trading, 150 F.3d at 151-52.
47. Id. at 152.
48. 41 F.3d 1221.
49. Id. at 1222.
50. See Purcell, supra note 7, at 876. The Supreme Court in United States Bancorp originally
addressed the issue of vacatur after settlement because the parties settled the case after the Court granted
writ of certiorari and requested vacatur from the Supreme Court. United States Bancorp, 513 U.S. at 20.
[Vol. 1999, No. I
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to vacate an opinion, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2106.5' Judge Winter then explained
that historically an appellate court retained the power to vacate even when the
decision before it became moot.52 This power was "circumscribed" by the Supreme
Court's decision in United States Bancorp, which held that "mootness by reason of
settlement does not justify vacatur of a judgment under review" absent "exceptional
circumstances."53
Because the Supreme Court has not addressed what constitutes "exceptional
circumstances" adequate to justify vacatur of a judgement mooted by settlement,
Judge Winter turned to the only other reported circuit court opinion addressing the
issues: the U.S. Court of Appeals, First Circuit's decision in Motta v. District
Director of Immigration and Naturalization Services.54
The Second Circuit found that the facts of Motta paralleled the facts of Pacific
Trading." In both Motta and Pacific Trading, the party requesting vacatur was a
repeat litigant who would not "relinquish its right to appeal a decision that might
harm it in future litigation. 5 6 Furthermore, the party in each case who was
successful in the lower court was willing to vacate in order to effect a settlement,
which it preferred over awaiting a court decision.57 Finally, in assessing the value
of the lower court's opinion as precedent, the Second Circuit determined that, as in
Motta, the social value of vacatur of the district court's decision outweighed the
social value of its precedent, stating that "[t]he only damage to the public interest
from... vacatur would be that the validity of MLB's marks would be left to future
litigation."" The court concluded that these reasons were sufficient to constitute
"exceptional circumstances" and therefore the court vacated the district court's
decision as moot and dismissed MLB's motion for an injunction. 59
V. COMMENT
With no guidance from the U.S. Supreme Court on how to assess whether
"exceptional circumstances" were present, the court in Pacific Trading shadowed the
opinion of Motta and determined that the interest of a repeat litigant in avoiding the
adverse judgment, coupled with the concern that the other party would suffer
injustice if the parties did not settle the case, constituted "exceptional
51. Pacific Trading, 150 F.3d at 151. 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (1994) states that an appellate court has the
power to "affirm, modify, vacate, set aside or reverse any judgment, decree, or order of a court lawfully
brought before [the appellate court] for review."
52. Pacific Trading, 150 F.3d at 151. When the judgment before the court has become moot, the
court cannot determine the merits of the case. Walling v. Reuter, 321 U.S. 671, 677 (1944). In such a
situation, the appellate court may either vacate the lower court's decision or remand the decision to the
lower court to determine whether or not to vacate, whichever "justice may require." See id. at 677;
Nahrebeski, 41 F.3d at 1221.
53. Pacific Trading, 150 F.3d at 151.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 151-52.
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circumstances." Central to the holding of the court, although not fully articulated,
is that the parties in Pacific Trading and Motta desired vacatur in order to facilitate
settlement, whereas the parties in United States Bancorp first settled the case, and
then requested vacatur.6 l
Prior to United States Bancorp, vacatur following settlement was granted fairly
routinely, and repeat litigants could agree to settle a case with confidence that, if
requested, the appellate court would vacate the lower court's decision.6 2 This
permitted repeat litigants, rather than the courts, to control the litigation by gambling
with the chance of a favorable decision in the lower court and only considering
settlement after an adverse judgment, "disturb[ing] the orderly operation of the
federal judicial system., 63
After United States Bancorp, courts now disfavor vacatur due to settlement, so
the possibility of repeat litigants settling first, then requesting vacatur of lower court
decisions is unlikely." With repeat litigants, vacatur may always be necessary to
facilitate post-trial settlement.65 Whether the unavailability of vacatur then leads to
an increase in pre-trial settlement, thereby balancing the decrease in settlement at the
post-trial stage, or leads merely to an increase in the advanced stages of litigation,
is debatable.'
The court in Pacific Trading seems to express sympathy for the need of repeat
litigants to avoid the consequences of adverse judgments.67 This sympathy ignores
the obvious fact that the repeat litigant lost at the lower court level and wishes to
settle in order to "cut his losses." To ensure that decisions adverse to repeat litigants
remain on the public records, just as they would for any other party, is a substantial
public interest, which the court in Pacific Trading essentially dismissed.6" To
prevent the appearance of favoring repeat litigants, the court should have stressed
that it was granting vacatur only because justice demanded resolving the dispute
through settlement, to which the repeat litigant would not agree absent vacatur, but
that normally a party's classification as a "repeat litigant" would not justify vacatur,
even if refusing vacatur in many cases would prevent settlement. A "what justice
demands" rule would create less confusion and help ensure that litigants, whether
repeat or first-time, would be treated equally.
VI. CONCLUSION
Settlement of cases is of significant value to our society and the courts should
encourage and facilitate settlement whenever justice so demands, even if that
requires the court to vacate a lower court decision. But where justice to the parties
60. Id. at 152.
61. See id.
62. See supra text accompanying note 5.
63. United States Bancorp, 513 U.S. at 27-28.
64. See Allen, supra note 3.
65. See discussion supra Part 111.
66. See. e.g., Purcell, supra note 7, at 868; discussion supra Part Il.
67. See generally Pacific Trading, 150 F.3d at 152.
68. See supra text accompanying note 57.
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does not require vacatur, the courts should not grant it, even if denying vacatur
results in the parties fully prosecuting their claims. By taking a narrow, but not
prohibitive view of vacatur, courts can prevent repeat litigants from controlling the
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